Hi, the document you linked earlier, for the 2022 stress testing, says quite clearly that the banks use their own modelling (bottom pp 2). The RBNZ can then go back to them and challenge bits of it and ask for refinements.
I don't have a problem with stress testing exercises, but that's just what they are... exercises. Here's a tell... if…
Hi, the document you linked earlier, for the 2022 stress testing, says quite clearly that the banks use their own modelling (bottom pp 2). The RBNZ can then go back to them and challenge bits of it and ask for refinements.
I don't have a problem with stress testing exercises, but that's just what they are... exercises. Here's a tell... if things are so strong - still profitable even after the proposed conditions - why demand higher capital requirements through 2028?
I have not seen an equivalent reporting from RBNZ. If you look at delinquency rates, non seasonally adjusted, all banks, you can see the rate peaked at 11.3% in Q1 2010. Funny similarity with the NZ 2022 scenario of 11.2% residential default. Are we modelling the last crash?
Hi, the document you linked earlier, for the 2022 stress testing, says quite clearly that the banks use their own modelling (bottom pp 2). The RBNZ can then go back to them and challenge bits of it and ask for refinements.
I don't have a problem with stress testing exercises, but that's just what they are... exercises. Here's a tell... if things are so strong - still profitable even after the proposed conditions - why demand higher capital requirements through 2028?
A good page for historical delinquencies and charge-offs at US banks is here https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/default.htm
I have not seen an equivalent reporting from RBNZ. If you look at delinquency rates, non seasonally adjusted, all banks, you can see the rate peaked at 11.3% in Q1 2010. Funny similarity with the NZ 2022 scenario of 11.2% residential default. Are we modelling the last crash?